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Re-crafting a Public Domain
Lawrence Lessig*
INTRODUCTION
There is a public domain, but it is small, relative to its history, and it is
shrinking. Digital technology will only speed its decline. And because
most are oblivious to the particular threat that digital technology poses for
the public domain, the prospects for reversing this trend are not promising.
On the present path, the idea of the public domain will be as familiar to
our children as the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is to our
students.
This loss of the public domain, properly understood, will be a profound
loss for freedom and culture, or more precisely, free culture. It will also be
persistent. For the mechanisms that will effect the elimination of this
domain are not merely legal doctrines. The mechanisms are machines
protected by the most powerful (if delicate) technologies of control that
man has devised.
My aim in this essay is to frame a way of talking about this public
domain, and to map a strategy for its defense. The defense will come both
from rebuilding the public domain, properly understood, and from crafting
an "effective" public domain-meaning a free space that functions as a
public domain, even though the resources that constitute it are not properly
within the public domain.
The frame connects directly with work done long before the digital age
that aimed to understand, or more precisely, to correct a misunderstanding
about "the commons." Yet that work, too, shares a pre-digital blindness to
the problems that digital technologies create for a commons, as well as a
blindness about the usable tools to correct them. Put most concisely, the
reformers too are too wedded to pre-digital truths. Until they become
comfortable recommending strategies that in the pre-digital age they
(rightly) condemned, we will make little progress in stopping the current
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to Richard Craswell and Mark Lemley for
comments on an earlier draft. This essay is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial license. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/.
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march.
I. A PUBLIC DOMAIN
As Jessica Litman defined the term, the "public domain" includes not
only those works never copyrighted, or those works no longer protected by
copyright. The public domain also includes the access secured to
copyrighted works by the express limits on the scope of copyright. Thus
facts or ideas are not copyrightable. They are within the public domain.
Likewise the use protected by "fair use" is within the public domain as,
again, it is an express limit on scope of copyright.'
This "public domain" is free. No one is paid for its use. It is also, and
distinctly, "permission free." I do not need the permission of Disney to
copy the ideas in Steamboat Willie. Nor do I need its permission to make a
"fair use" of its foundational cartoon.2 In this sense, a resource is
"permission free" if the right to use the resource does not depend upon
anyone's subjective will. In the frame of Calabresi and Malamud, liability
entitlements are "permission free" resources; property entitlements are
not. It follows that a "permission free" resource could cost something, so
long as the user had a right to buy access to the resource. The key freedom
that "permission free" marks is the freedom from a subjective will.
This freedom has a value. That value is speech-related. Yet despite the
important work of First Amendment scholars such as Jed Rubenfeld and
Jack Balkin, there is still an unwillingness within the legal culture to
recognize the salience of this freedom to free speech values more
generally.3 For example, the Supreme Court is perpetually eager to
discipline Congress as Congress struggles to regulate pornography on the
Internet.4 Yet the Court has yet to find First Amendment values implicated
by the regulation of speech that we call "copyright" despite its increasing
burden upon free speech generally.
The burden to free speech that I mean is emphatically not that speech
resources are costly. That burden is an important one, no doubt, as
1. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). Pam Samuelson has
recently offered a rich catalog of the range of views (she counts 11) defining the public domain.
Pamela Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW (L. Guibault & P. B. Hugenholtz eds.)
(forthcoming, 2006). Samuelson tries to narrow these to a core set. My description does little to
respect the subtlety she has mapped.
2. There is, however, some evidence Disney, and other major studios, do not think so. See J.D.
LASICA, DARKNET (2005).
3. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); J. Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright's Constitution, 112 YALE L. J. 1 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004) (upholding preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(striking down the Communications Decency Act).
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Rebecca Tushnet has argued extensively.5 But there is a value in a
"permission free" zone distinct from equity (though as we will see, equity
enters the story very quickly).6 That value is related to the core ideals
protected by limits on content-based or viewpoint-based speech
regulation. Just as free speech requires a general immunity from content-
or viewpoint-based regulation, free culture requires a substantial immunity
from content- or viewpoint-based constraints on the cultivation and spread
of our culture.7
In principle, the "permission free" zone of the public domain is to
provide that immunity. But whether it does depends upon one more
consideration: whether the contours of that public domain are easily
navigated. In this sense, free culture requires not just a "permission free"
zone, but also a "lawyer free" zone: the freedoms secured by the
permission free zone of the public domain must be relatively self-
authenticating. They must, that is, be freedoms that are useable by those
who depend upon them, without the burdens of significant legal cost and
uncertainty. That there are works that are no longer protected by copyright
is important; that one be able to identify those works easily is essential. Or
again, that there be a domain of "fair use" is important; that one be able to
identify that domain without risking extraordinarily punitive damages, or
spending significant resources on legal advice, is essential. The law must
craft the public domain to make it useable, meaning that it must be
(relatively) simple for those who depend upon it to determine its freedoms.
The reason for this extra condition should be obvious. Unless the
freedoms of the public domain are self-authenticating, they will be
unequally distributed. Unequal distribution, of course, is nothing new in
our society. But unequal distribution here is something special. To the
extent that there is inequality here, it is an inequality produced directly by
state action. If between two rules for limning this permission-free zone,
the government selects one that is costly over another that is not, all other
factors being equal, then the inequality such rules produce is the product
of government action. And as this inequality directly affects speech, the
5. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535 (2004).
6. And hence my concern is distinct from Goldstein's early concern about "enterprise
monopolies" affecting First Amendment values in the context of aggregations of copyrights. See Paul
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLuM. L. REv. 983 (1970).
7. Obviously, in this comparison between the norms of free speech and free culture, the source of
the "constraints" on each is different. The focus of free speech norms is typically constraints imposed
directly by the state through rules regulating speech, while the focus of free culture norms is
constraints imposed indirectly by the state, and directly by individuals, exercising monopoly rights
granted by the state (i.e., copyrights). I will take it for granted here-though it is by no means taken
for granted in the law-that this difference, though important, does not negate any First Amendment
concern. Others have done a great deal to establish this point, though that so much work would have to
be done is, at least, surprising. See Rubenfeld, supra note 3; Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970).
[Supp.:56
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question the law should ask is whether any legitimate government interest
supports such inequality.
I will leave it to others to argue that there is such a legitimate state
interest. I assume there is not. But the legal system functions with an
almost studied blindness to this inequality. Lawyers and judges in
particular are quick to celebrate the importance of the theoretical limits on
the regulations of speech through copyright-limitations such as "fair use"
or the idea/expression distinction. Yet almost without exception, they are
blind to the ineffectiveness of these limitations, given the nature of the law
as it is right now.8
Free culture jurisprudence must account for these second-order legal
limitations. It does so by adding to the description of a cultural
environment an account of the costs of exercising the freedoms within this
permission-free zone. And thus can we qualify Jessica Litman's definition:
the public domain, technically, is the permission-free zone defined by the
limits of copyright. But the effective public domain is the lawyer-free zone
of freedoms constituted by the nature and efficiency of the limits on
copyright.
From this perspective, it should be obvious that whatever the technical
reach of the "public domain" in current American law, the effective public
domain is tiny. Copyright terms are "limited." But even though limited,
there is no simple way to know which works are no longer protected by
copyright, and which works are. In America, works published before 1923
are in the public domain, though sound recordings are not, nor are a host
of other creative works creatively exempted from the ordinary meaning of
the word "published."9 The practice of publishers is to mark all work as
copyrighted, whether published initially before 1923 or not.
From 1923 on, the story becomes murkier. For work published after
1922 and before 1964, the copyright status depends upon whether the
work was registered when published, and whether the copyright was
renewed twenty-eight years later. As the majority of works published were
likely never registered, and as the vast majority of registered works were
never renewed, the public domain potential of this period is quite great. °
But as there is no simple or accessible database of such registrations or
renewals, there is no simple (or lawyer-free) way to identify the public
domain.
For those works created between 1963 and 1978, the task of identifying
8. The single prominent exception to this blindness is a self-critical piece by William Patry and
Judge Richard Posner. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. (2004).
9. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 4 N.Y.3d 540, 560 (2005) (describing
common law copyright for recordings); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 89
(1966) (describing gerrymander of "publication" rules).
10. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform (aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485 (2004).
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the public domain is easier, but its scope is much smaller. Works
published after December 31, 1963, and before January 1, 1978, are
protected by copyright if initially registered. The renewal requirement was
removed in 1988.11 But again, there is no easily accessible database of
such registrations.
After December 31, 1977, the problem of identifying the public domain
is simpler still, but the scope of the public domain is smaller still. Before
1978, work entered the public domain if published and not registered.
After 1978, all work is protected by a federal copyright upon creation, and
until seventy years after the author has died. For published works, this
may prove to be an easier line to negotiate (at least once it becomes
relevant).12 We might expect simpler databases to develop for identifying
authors, at least for published work. But for work that is not published-
and hence, work that has no necessary link to a particular author-it will
be practically impossible to identify when such work enters the public
domain.
That is the status of the public domain fed through copyright expiration
(assuming at least that Congress permits copyrights to expire). The status
of the public domain fed through the limits on copyright's reach is even
more tenuous.
There is in principle a line of "originality" that puts facts and ideas into
the public domain. For text, how that line divides might be relatively clear.
But for film and music, the line is simply illusory. The same is true of the
"idea/expression" distinction. Ideas are in the public domain: what the
idea is behind Einstein's 1905 paper about special relativity is clear (if
difficult); what the idea is of Claude Debussy's "La Mer" is not. 3
Finally, the same is true for that part of the public domain fed by "fair
use." The rules of "fair use" are self-consciously not self-authenticating.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that lower courts not develop
simple, automatic rules. 4 The effect is that fair use in practice becomes
the right to hire a lawyer, in contexts in which the defense of fair use
rights is effectively impossible.1
5
Again, because this point is so systematically missed, especially by
11. See Beme Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853-2861 (1988).
12. The soonest any work copyrighted in 1978 could enter the public domain is 2049.
13. Judge Kaplan expressed similar skepticism in his classic AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 56 (1968).
14. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ("The task is not to be
simplified with bright-line rules .... ).
15. Technically, "fair use" functions as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement. That
balance made sense when the force of copyright regulation got applied through a legal action. As the
rules of copyright become embedded in technology, however, it may well make more sense to
conceive of "fair use" as a right. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE 139 (1999) (discussing the "Cohen Theorem," which supports an affirmative right to
hack to protect fair use).
[Supp.:56
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judges, it bears repeating and emphasis. If a documentary filmmaker wants
to include a clip from a news program in her film, the standard procedure
is to ask permission, regardless of the length, and regardless of the clip's
transformative nature. If the clip is from ABC's Good Morning, America,
she will not receive permission. ABC, at least currently, does not license
any of its Good Morning, America material for reuse.
The filmmaker must therefore decide whether, despite that denial, the
use of the clip is nonetheless "fair." That inquiry is fundamentally
uncertain. But even if the filmmaker and her lawyer are quite convinced of
the "fair use" status of the clip the filmmaker wants to include, their
confidence is ordinarily not sufficient to free the film that would include
that clip. Films are viewed only if distributed; they are distributed only
with "Errors and Omissions" insurance. And E&O insurance is typically
issued only if the filmmaker can represent that each clip used within the
film was "cleared." The effective right of fair use for filmmakers is thus
not only costly, but constrained, as the expense of error is so
extraordinarily high. 6
The reality for most filmmakers is thus not a public domain. It is a
permission domain. The "use" of culture is not a right; it is a permission
slip. And while we might not be so concerned about these constraints
when we think of the latest "Batman" remake, or the burden placed on
George Lucas, it takes a willed obliviousness not to see the First
Amendment values implicated when we consider documentary films, or
any film commenting upon matters of public import. The reality is that
while the law effectively secures to writers a broad and unquestioned
freedom to quote without permission, it grants no such freedom to
filmmakers.
A. The Problem Machines Add to This Mix
So far my description of the effective public domain has focused
exclusively upon the constraints imposed by law, both technical and
practical. These are the constraints we know today. They are widely
ignored of course, especially on the Internet. But whether ignored or not,
they are the legal restrictions that define the scope of free culture.
Yet, in the future, these legal constraints will not be as significant, or
effective, as technological constraints. These technological constraints
remain invisible to most today, and because the genesis of these
constraints seems so absurd to most, most refuse even to name them.
1 7
16. See Documentary Filmmakers' Statement of Best Practices in Fair Use (2005), available at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf (last visited February 20,
2006).
17. Most, not all. Jessica Litman made this same point a decade ago. See Jessica Litman, The
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 34-35 (1994).
2006]
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To see this point, we need to make some obvious points about the
difference between analog and digital culture.
In the analog world, the regulation of copyright is the exception. In the
digital world, the regulation of copyright is the rule. Or again, in the
analog world, there are many "uses" of creative work that never trigger the
law of copyright. In the digital world, there is no use of creative work that
does not, technically at least, trigger the law of copyright. If the law of
copyright protects the exclusive right to "copy," then as digital
technologies make copies with every use, there is no use of a creative
work in a digital network that does not trigger the law of copyright.
No doubt, today that trigger too often fires a blank. It may be technically
true that the law requires permission, but it is effectively true that no
permission is needed. Relative to the baselines of the law, the Internet is
home to massive copyright infringement. No consequence follows from
most of that infringement. Regulation may be everywhere, but that
regulation is largely irrelevant.
At least for now. But the irrelevance of law comes from an obvious
contingency about the architecture of the current digital network. The
Internet as originally constituted enabled this permission-less use, because
the Internet as originally constituted, like the pre-Internet world it
increasingly replaces, technically had no way to implement anything
different.
That contingency, however, is changing. Through a relatively swift
transformation in the basic elements of the network, the network is
increasingly recognizing a permissions layer, layered onto the original
Internet. This permissions layer will enforce the permission the law
establishes by default. It will require, in a physical sense, the permission
that the law now requires by rule.
This will be the consequence of the set of technologies ordinarily
referred to as "DRM"--digital rights management technologies. DRM
technologies enable fine-grained control over how content is used in a
digital environment. They control whether the content can be copied, or
how often; they control how long the content survives; they control whom
the content can be shared with, or whether it can be altered or transformed,
DRM thus uses technology to enforce control of content, independent of
whether the law authorizes that control.
It is my view that DRM will increasingly get layered onto the Internet,
and thus expand the physical capacity to enforce the rules the law enforces
through (largely empty) threats. These physical restrictions of course will
never be perfect. But neither need they be. Uses outside of the range
permitted will be rendered effectively impossible for most users by raising
the cost of noncompliance beyond the reach of most. Compare: it is not
impossible to occupy CBS and take over the evening news; it's just
sufficiently difficult that no one does.
[Supp.:56
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We could argue endlessly about when this change will occur. There
might even be a reason to argue about whether it will occur. But the
important point for my purposes here is that if the almost taken-for-
granted set of changes that technologists now discuss actually happens,
then the environment of free culture will have been radically changed.
Today, the practice of free culture happens, albeit against the law.
Tomorrow, the practice will simply not happen. The difference is not a
difference in the legal authority given. The difference is a product of the
technical environment within which those permissions are granted. In a
line, the code will then make the law effective by making it effectively
impossible for anyone to ignore the law.
This change will not break the Internet. It will not destroy much of the
value of the Internet. In fact, to the extent the Internet is viewed as a
"read-only" medium, facilitating the efficient delivery of culture created
elsewhere, these changes will actually improve the Internet. They will
lower the "piracy" costs of an imperfect market, and thus raise the returns
to those who benefit from the distribution of professional created culture.
But these changes will destroy a different ecology of cultural creation:
tautologically, that ecology of creativity that cannot secure permission
from the rights holder. One part of that excluded ecology is excluded
because of resource constraints (the stuff costs too much). One part is
excluded because the substance of their use is beyond the preferences of
the rights holder (the use is not the sort of use the copyright owner will
allow). To be included in a movie, or within a political ad; to be remixed
with hip hop; to be rendered in a way that criticizes: these are "uses"
enabled by the technology today that will only happen tomorrow if the
technology permits.
Finally, DRM will quite directly affect one important part of the public
domain-fair use. As the doctrine is currently crafted, "fair use" requires a
determination of the purposes for which a use is directed. As it is currently
implemented, DRM cannot grok that purpose. Thus, as many have noted,
the effect of widespread deployment of DRM upon the content of our
culture will restrict significantly the "fair use" component to the public
domain.
In these obvious ways, then, the public domain is fading. While the law
of copyright in principle reserves a permission free zone, the law as
currently constituted renders that permission free zone unusable. However
strong in principle those limits are, in practice they give little support to a
wide range of citizens and creators. More significantly, as the reach of the
regulation of copyright expands, from regulating just a portion of the
possible uses of culture in the analog world to effectively all uses of
culture in the digital world, that melting accelerates. And thus while the
practical consequence of this change today may be small, the practical
consequence tomorrow, once the technologies of control get added into
2006]
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the mix, will be profound.
II. THE COMMONS
Culture is the classic comedic commons. In the sense that Carol Rose
first taught us,' 8 culture is precisely the sort of commons that gets enriched
(rather than depleted) the more people consume it. Culture is reference;
reference is meaning; meaning is life. Of course, there is no guarantee that
the meaning is a happy one. The enrichment of a cultural reference might
well make some unhappy. But nonetheless, use makes the reference more
salient. And as technologies and experience increase the depth and
frequency of the connections that bind cultures together, the value to all
within that culture increases as more get to use, and reuse, that culture.
This is the core assumption I bring to this argument about the fading
public domain. For the richness of culture comes not just from its
consumption (a use that the technologies of perfect control will well
supply). The richness comes as well from a broad range of participants
actively making, and remaking, the culture. This is the use of culture that
the future of DRM will not (yet) support. Such use in a digital context
triggers copyright law; DRM will connect that trigger to meaningful
enforcement. If the law remains as it is defined today, that enforcement
will smother much of the potential of digital networks to reinvigorate a
democratic free culture.
I recognize that as it stands, the value I claim for this free culture is
nothing more than an assertion. My aim in this essay is not to defend that
assertion. It is instead to ask how one who accepts it should meaningfully
respond. Or more directly: in light of this change in the public domain,
what possible responses are there to revive or restore a permission-free, or
lawyer-free, zone for culture?
In the balance of this essay, I identify first the legal reform that might
revive a public domain. Such reform is unlikely. I therefore conclude by
reviewing an effort at private reform that, while not affecting the technical
scope of "the public domain," builds a commons that produces effectively
the same result as the public domain-a permission-free, and lawyer-free,
zone of culture. This again is the "effective public domain."
A. Legal Reform to Support Permission-Free Culture
While the law of copyright has evolved slowly over the past hundred
years, the effect and significance of the law of copyright has changed
dramatically in the past ten. From the narrow perspective of copyright
treatises, the changes in copyright law have been small, and obvious: slow
18. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711,712 (1986).
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extensions to new technologies, such as devices to reproduce music, and
then radio, and film; steady extensions in the term of copyright,
responding not to the logic of incentives, but to the dynamics of political
power; simplifications in the manner by which copyright attaches, and
runs with creative property.
Had the world remained analog, none of these changes would have
harmed the development and spread of culture. The extension of
protection to new technologies still left the force of copyright regulation
bearing most significantly upon commercial actors. The extension of term
kept the cost of certain creative work higher than it otherwise would have
been-but as the effective prices of access to culture were falling
generally, this addition was hardly noticed. And the simplifications in the
manner by which copyright attaches-effected through changes in
America beginning in 1976, and transforming American copyright law
from an opt-in to (in theory) an opt-out system of protection--did not
matter much to ordinary culture, as again the real trigger for the law was
only ever pulled by commercial entities. There were exceptions to this of
course-the Xerox machine and the VCR being the most prominent. 19 But
in the main, what IP scholars studied until the birth of the Internet was not
strategies for regulating citizens, but strategies for regulating commercial
entities. As Lyman Ray Patterson described the law of copyright (even
while rightly regretting its massively expanded scope), copyright was born
as industrial policy-regulating competitors."z And through most of the
twentieth century, that is all it really was.
But the world did not remain analog. Beginning technically in the early
1970s, and effectively in the late 1990s, more and more of human life
moved from analog to digital. And as I have already described, that move
means that more and more of life moved to a platform where "copying"
was the default. That default, in turn, means that negotiating the law of
copyright too becomes a default. For the first time in the history of
copyright, its target is no longer narrowly tailored to a copyright industry;
for the first time, it is universal. As Jessica Litman put the point more than
a decade ago:
At the turn of the century, U.S. copyright law was technical,
inconsistent, and difficult to understand, but it didn't apply to very
many people or very many things. If one were an author or publisher
of books, maps, charts, paintings, sculpture, photographs or sheet
music, a playwright or producer of plays, or a printer, the copyright
law bore on one's business. Booksellers, piano-roll and phonograph
record publishers, motion picture producers, musicians, scholars,
19. For a description of the emergence of democratic copy machines (the Xerox), see PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 81 (1994).
20. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968).
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members of Congress, and ordinary consumers could go about their
business without ever encountering a copyright problem.
Ninety years later, the U.S. copyright law is even more technical,
inconsistent and difficult to understand; more importantly, it touches
everyone and everything. In the intervening years, copyright has
reached out to embrace much of the paraphernalia of modem society.
... Technology, heedless of law, has developed modes that insert
multiple acts of reproduction and transmission-potentially
actionable events under the copyright statute-into commonplace
daily transactions. Most of us can no longer spend even an hour
without colliding with the copyright law. 2'
Two features of the architecture of copyright law combine with one
feature of the architecture of a digital network to produce this change.
First, in America, copyright law since 1909 has regulated "copies.
22
When that change was effected, the difference didn't matter much. The
technologies to effect "copies" in 1909 were relatively few, and the
distribution of those technologies was concentrated. But the nominal reach
of the law meant that the scope of the law changed as the technologies for
effecting copies changed.
The second feature of American law was a shift beginning in 1976 from
narrowly tailored copyright regulation (regulation tied to those authors
who opt-in to the copyright system) to indiscriminate copyright protection
(regulating any creative work reduced to a tangible form).23
These two changes again would hardly have mattered had the world
remained analog. But they become tectonic when the world moves to
digital. They establish a presumptive default that permission is required
for any "use" of culture, a default that has no precedent in the Anglo-
American tradition.
Some might be mistakenly seduced by the nature of the world I am
describing-one where permission is always required. I do not mean
totalitarians. I mean economists. One advantage of the permission culture
is that the "right to use" becomes a kind Of property right. One advantage
of property rights is that they enable resources to move to the highest
valued user. One disadvantage of the commons is that it is not possible-
at least if exclusive rights are necessary-to move property to its highest
valued user. Thus, the economist might be encouraged by a change from
commons to property.
But before making this leap, the economist should reckon a fact about
our copyright system that is generally obscure. The argument for property
21. Litman, supra note 17, at 34-35.
22. See Lyman Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 12
(1989) (describing change in law).
23. See Sprigman, supra note 10.
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depends fundamentally upon the efficiency of the property system. It
assumes, that is, a property system where at a minimum it is possible to
know who owns what. Even then, a property system may suffer an
anticommons problem.24 But long before we get to the anticommons, we
must consider whether the property system performs its most basic
function-again, identifying who owns what.25
Yet this is precisely what our current system of copyright law does not
do. Because we have abandoned the law of our Founders, and embraced
the law of the French, we have given up any requirement within copyright
that works be registered, or owners identified. Again, there are no
complete lists of copyright holders. There is no simple way to identify
who owns what rights. Thus the emergence of the permission culture is
not the explosion of perfect markets for culture. Instead, the particular
architecture of the permission culture that we now have affirmatively
disables markets from allocating or reallocating resources efficiently.
These rights are thus not building blocks; they are instead just blocks.
These features of the current interaction between the architectures of
copyright and digital networks suggest at least three changes in the law
that might mitigate the effects of this permission culture. I outline these
changes in the balance of this section.
1. Taking the "Copy" Out of Copyright.
The simplest way to respond to this change in the default produced by
copyright's regulation of "copies" in a world where copying is as common
as breathing would be to embrace a suggestion by Yale scholars Ernie
Miller and Joan Feigenbaum-that we remove "reproduction" from the
exclusive rights that copyright law grants.26 The law would then have to be
reformed to better target those uses at the core of the monopoly right. But
by removing "copying" from the collection of exclusive rights copyright
law grants, 27 we could avoid many of the unintended consequences of the
24. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy oftheAnticommons, Ill HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998).
25. Mark Lemley makes this point powerfully and concisely in his What's Different About
Intellectual Property, 83 TEX L. REV. 1097, 1101-02 (2005).
26. Ernie Miller & Joan Feigenbaum, Taking the "Copy" out of Copyright, available at
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/-ds/SPYCE/papers/MF.pdf (last visited February 20, 2006).
27. The core rights protected by American copyright law are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
2006]
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interaction between old law and new technology.
The best example of this unintended, and unproductive, interaction is
the battle currently brewing over Google Book Search. In December,
2004, Google announced a project to "google-ize" 18,000,000 books from
five major research libraries. As a study by the OCLC estimates, that
18,000,000 is a significant proportion of the total number of books now
contained within the world catalog of publications (WorldCat):
32,000,000. Of those 32,000,000, approximately 5,400,000 are in the
public domain. Approximately 3,000,000 are in print and in copyright.
And the balance-23,600,000, or seventy-five percent of these works-
are in copyright, yet out of print.
Google's project will give at least some access to all 18,000,000 books.
The kind of access depends upon the status of the book. If the book is in
the public domain, then Google will give full access to the book. If the
book is in print and the publishers agree, then Google would give limited
access (a few pages around any search) to the book. And if the book is still
within copyright, but no express permission has been granted, then Google
would make just "snippets" of the text available. Here is an example of
this "snippet" access.
Tre Stotlee of Ploner Lft
by M-y C 10r - Jar.. W . ...... C . ..t




modest riumphs of pioneer life.
the- slorie, are lov.ingly dedicated.
P e
inite .tll ,fikm , where they hia ed. The liro'ns we
ph- t ...ers. . d were noted for their upright co-0.
,hadt .ity. Many of the ne.. . ee teacher.
Mw h,, t-1~ [4 the
P.I.Wd W-W-~o
- Wen I-tw I, oh- dt T- Stoe, at Pu Ut.
• olt,, mu, tote to Tne utoa at PIone Ut.
Otie T_ Sti. P M L6
Aotlouj) K4.7 C. WM0.n
Netut-r Jar. WA_ & 0 C. a*o
P.-te 124
Image No. 1.: Google Book Search Snippet View
28
digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. §106 (2000).
28. Google, Google Book Search Snippet View, available at http://books.google.com/google
books/about.htm (last visited April 4, 2006).
........... - 1 . ... ......
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Thus, for all the books in the Google Book Search database, Google
would grant at least "snippet" access. Any access beyond snippets would
depend upon the work either being in the public domain or upon copyright
holder permission. For any work in the Google database, however, the
copyright holder could request that Google remove the work, and Google
has promised to comply. The project promises to expand the access to our
past more dramatically than anything since the invention of a library. It is
an extraordinary gift to culture, even if it was also a way for Google to
make (even more) money.
Google's "use" of the public domain works is uncontroversial. It argues
that its "use" of the copyrighted works is "fair." The Authors Guild and
many publishers have disagreed. In late 2005, the Authors Guild and five
publishers (supported by the American Association of Publishers) filed
two separate suits against Google, claiming Google's project constituted
"massive copyright infringement."
The legal question raised by these cases is difficult: is Google's use of
the copyrighted works "fair use"? That question inaugurates a complex
and uncertain inquiry, ostensibly guided by four statutory questions.29
There is strong precedent supporting Google.3° There is some precedent
going the other way.31 But in my view, the strongest argument supporting
a finding of "fair use" turns upon the insanely inefficient property system
that copyright is. If the OCLC's estimates are correct, then the transaction
costs of securing permission for close to seventy-five percent of this
collection are essentially infinite. And one core justification for "fair use"
has always been to avoid unproductive transaction costs.
32
Put aside, however, the merits of the argument for "fair use." The
significance of this case is the very idea that copyright owners have a say
at all about how Google builds its index. That idea is the product of the
interaction between the architecture of copyright law and the architecture
of digital technologies. The equivalent to the Google Book Search in
analog space is the card catalog. It, too, indexed published works; its
purpose, too, was to facilitate easy access to those works. But no one
would have imagined that publishers or copyright owners had the right to
control how a card catalog gets built. And that is because one building a
card catalog in analog space does not trigger copyright law.
29. The four questions are: (I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. See
17 U.S.C. §107.
30. The strongest authority for Google is Kelly v. Arriba Soft Co., 280 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2002).
31. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
32. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1610-11 (1982); see also Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 25-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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A digital card catalog is different, again because to make the catalog
requires copying the original work. And thus, because of the interaction
between copyright law and digital technology, the reach of copyright law
in digital space is radically greater.
That difference, in turn, provides the affirmative argument for removing
the reproduction right from the bundle of rights copyright law grants. In a
world where copying is as common.as breathing, the exclusive right to
copy no longer tracks the necessary or productive control that copyright
owner needs. Instead, its indiscriminate reach simply introduces strategic
costs into the creative process. Those costs have little to do with any
efficient incentive to create. Thus the reason to carve back the exclusive
right to exclude any control over the act of copying.
It may seem odd that we would have a system called "copyright" that
did not protect the right to copy. But there's nothing historically odd about
excluding the reproduction right from the rights granted by copyright.
From 1790 to 1909 in the United States, the law of copyright did not grant
authors an exclusive right to copy. For most of our history, the law was
more narrowly tailored, targeting uses properly needing the protection of
the exclusive right. That again could be our strategy, Miller, Feigenbaum,
and I would suggest. And if it were, it would at least alter the most
dramatic, if least considered, effect of the interaction between copyright
and technology.
2. Restoring Formalities
A second obvious reform would be to restore the opt-in character to
copyright, thereby eliminating its reach over creative work that does not
opt in to the copyright system. Scholars have just begun the process of
reckoning the cost of giving up formalities. Chris Sprigman's work is the
most extensive,33 though no doubt it is just the beginning of a wide range
of similar scholarship.
The basic insight motivating Sprigman is that the decision to shift from
an opt-in to an opt-out copyright regime has had unintended and harmful
consequences in the digital world. Again, it did not matter much that work
was copyrighted in the analog world since most uses of copyrighted work
was free. There were very few ways that ordinary citizens would interact
with copyright law in the world circa 1976. And thus the indiscriminate
extension of copyright to all creative work reduced to a tangible form
would not have mattered much in 1976.
It does matter now, now that permission is required generally. For if
permission is required, then we need a way to know from whom that
permission must be secured. Yet the abolishment of formalities has
33. See Sprigman, supra note 10.
[Supp.:56
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removed any easy possibility of knowing. A work is protected whether or
not you can identify who the owner is; it is a felony to use that work in
certain ways, even if there is no one to ask for the permission to use it.
The push to restore formalities has been resisted by the IP bar. In part,
their resistance is driven by, in my view, an inaccurate view of what
international law requires.34 In part, it is driven by a misestimation of the
burden of restoring a system of formalities: formalities were abolished
when the costs of complying with formalities internationally would have
been astronomical. But in the world of a free global Internet, the costs of
formalities could be trivial. And finally, in part the resistance is driven by
a view that it really does not matter if most people are "technically" in
violation of the law most of the time. If those enforcing the rights are
properly selective in their enforcement, the over breadth of this system of
regulation would not be costly.
I do not believe international law would block a properly crafted system
of formalities. I do believe we could architect such a system at a very low
cost. And I am fundamentally opposed to any system of speech regulation
that makes most speech illegal-even if you can trust the enforcers to
target only really bad illegal speech. There is a corrosive effect from
illegality that spreads beyond its generating domain. That corrosion is
precisely what I fear about the "anarchy" of the digital world: we tell our
kids their behavior is illegal; we wage what former MPAA president Jack
Valenti calls a "terrorist war" against that illegal behavior; and soon, the
targets of that war begin to internalize the names we call them.
A restored system of formalities would operate to narrow the reach of
copyright law to those works where protection is necessary, at least as
judged by the copyright owners. Only if an affirmative step were taken
would a work be protected by copyright. That affirmative step would
permit owners to signal that they intend to protect their rights; as a
byproduct, it would construct a registry of rights holders. The vast
majority of currently copyrighted material would quickly pass out of the
regulation of copyright. Remaining would be that material benefiting from
such monopoly protection.
This in turn would free a great deal of culture to the public domain.
More would therefore exist within the permission-free zone. And if
properly architected, the remaining copyrighted material would be
relatively self-authenticating. It would be easy to understand who owns
what, even possible without a lawyer. On both dimensions of the public
domain, then, such a move would be progress.
34. Id. at 551-68 (explaining why international law would not restrict formalities reform).
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3. A New York Times v. Sullivan for Fair Use
The final change that I describe is an obvious extension of First
Amendment jurisprudence into the realm of copyright law. The model for
the principle I believe we should extend is New York Times v. Sullivan.35
The context is the doctrine of "fair use."
Sullivan involved a certain kind of property right. The underlying tort at
issue protected the reputation of an individual. That resource is not truly
alienable. But it is an important aspect of individual capital which is
valuable for society to protect.
The issue in Sullivan, however, was how the importance of protecting
reputation should be reckoned with the equally important public function
of facilitating debate about matters of public import. The New York Times
had published an advertisement that allegedly harmed the reputation of the
plaintiff "Bo" Sullivan. The question was whether the First Amendment
would shield the New York Times from the traditional operation of
defamation law.
The Court held that it would. While the New York Times should not
have license to knowingly spread defamatory information about anyone,
the Court crafted an immunity from liability for defamation. That
immunity has evolved to be (1) if the matter was of public import, or (2)
the target was a public figure, and (3) the newspaper had no "actual
malice," meaning it did not know that the assertions it was making were
false, then the speaker is free of liability even if the statements made are
false and defamatory. This rule no doubt weakens the protection of
defamation law. But that weakening was justified, the Court reasoned, by
important free speech interests.
A similar principle could protect free speech in the context of "fair use."
As the law is currently crafted, "fair use" is a statutory defense to
copyright infringement. The defense is determined by weighing four
independent factors. These factors serve different copyright-related
functions. Some are trying to determine whether a market could supply the
use at issue better; some are trying to determine whether a subsidy to this
particular actor is justified.
But what the law does poorly is to recognize, or institutionalize, the
radically different inquiry that ought to obtain in the different speech
contexts within which "fair use" might be invoked.
For example, consider again a film that would like to use a clip from a
major news network. As the law currently stands, it is exceptionally
difficult to include such a clip in a film. This is both because the actual
case law supporting such use is thin, and because the norms within the
industry strongly oppose use without permission. Indeed, as I have
35. See N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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described, it is usually impossible to secure Errors and Omission insurance
without demonstrating every clip has been cleared. So whatever the formal
rule of law, the practical effect is that clips without permission can rarely
be included within a film.
If the film is a Hollywood blockbuster, that might not trouble you much.
But if the film is a documentary about matters of public import, then to a
lawyer steeped in New York Times v. Sullivan norms, the actual practice of
these restrictions on filmmaking will astonish. While the law has carved a
wide berth around reporters, insulating them from all but the most
egregious defamation-related liability, the law has been blind to the
arguably much more significant restrictive effect produced by copyright.
Put differently, I understand the chill that Sullivan addressed, even though
it is hard to accept the real harm to innocent reputations (not Sullivan's of
course, but others) that the rule has sanctioned. But I cannot understand
the refusal to recognize the equivalent chill that the current practice of fair
use with films has produced, especially because the actual property-related
harm from such a use of copyrighted material is effectively nil.
This concern would be important as a matter of principle in any case. It
is increasingly important as a matter of practice. There is a growing
resistance by major media outlets to license content to independent and
documentary filmmakers. In one case, for example, NBC refused to
license one minute of the President explaining his reasons for going to war
(the filmmaker's agent was originally told, "[I]t doesn't make the
president look very good"). These refusals sound like threats to producers,
funders, and insurance companies. The effect of these refusals is often to
force the material at issue out of the film-even though, again, in none of
these cases could one imagine that there is any economic harm to the
entities whose work is "fairly" used.
The remedy here would model itself on Sullivan. Just as Sullivan aims at
intentional torts only, so too could a Sullivan-like rule in copyright aim at
intentionally malicious breach only. The aim would be a rule that grants to
any actor using work as commentary or criticism in a matter of public
import a Sullivan-like buffer. That buffer would make it harder for a
copyright holder to threaten a filmmaker, by making it less likely that any
law suit could survive summary judgment.
The aim of such a rule would be to track the second dimension of the
public domain that I identified initially: to effect a lawyer-free zone of
culture. Artists and filmmakers should be able to negotiate the field of
copyright without the fear of oppressive liability and the cost of expensive
lawyers. A Sullivan-like rule could effectively secure that freedom for
creators, just as it has secured that freedom for reporters. Put differently,
there is no principled way to distinguish the need for protection in the
context of journalism from the need for protection in the context of
documentaries and the like, at least in the context in which digital
Lessig
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technologies have enabled an extraordinarily wide range of creators in
both fields.
III. RE-FORMrNG A COMMONS
In the previous section, I described a motivation for legal reform and
then sketched three relatively small changes in the law that would restore a
public domain. I am not optimistic that any of these changes will be
adopted anytime soon (though the third is certainly more likely than either
the first or second). "Copyright reform" in America today has nothing to
do with re-forming copyright to make it make sense in the digital age. The
aim of copyright reform today is to further extend the outdated features of
the current system, to protect powerful, if dying, copyright industries.
It is for this reason that a number of us have tried to develop private
responses to this public problem. This is not because we believe that only
private reform is necessary. Some may believe that. I certainly do not.
Instead, the stronger motivation is that waiting for public reform would
risk too much. As I describe more completely in the balance of this essay,
it is urgent now to awake recognition of the need for reform. For if the
strategy of DRM that I described initially gets deployed broadly, it will be
impossibly difficult at a later point to inspire even recognition of the
problems at stake.
The project that I will describe here is the one I am most familiar with-
Creative Commons. Creative Commons took its inspiration from the most
successful example of a private commons that we have seen so far: the
Free Software Movement. My aim here is not so much education about
Creative Commons as it is education about the strategy of using private
ordering to build a public commons. That question is quite general, even if
it is addressed in the context of a particular organization. And as the
strategy in general has been the target of a careful and informed
criticism,36 it is helpful to use the particular to reflect upon the more
general question.
In the terminology I will adopt, neither the Creative Commons, nor the
Free Software Movement, technically expands "the public domain." They
instead expand the "effective public domain" by creating a "commons," a
resource that anyone within the relevant community can use under
content-neutral terms.37 If the public domain is technically a domain
without property rights, the commons is not. The freedoms granted in this
commons are granted by the permission of property holders. But this
commons is experienced as a permission-free zone because the
36. See Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Can 't Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005).
37. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 19-22 (2001).
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permissions are granted up front. They are not negotiated as a condition of
use and are thus experienced in the same way the public domain is
experienced. And if the project does its work properly, the permission that
is granted can be understood without a lawyer-a lawyer-free zone, with
any necessary permission granted in advance. That, as I will use the term,
is a commons for intangible resources.
The qualification ("for intangible resources") is crucial. While there has
been an extraordinary amount of productive scholarship disabusing a
confused world about the nature of the "commons," the vast majority of
that scholarship has focused upon tangible resources held in common.38
And while the insights from that research are helpful in understanding
intangible commons as well, there are some habits of mind developed in
the tangible world that are misleading when applied to the intangible
commons. It is premature to do more than flag this problem just now. I
will return to it as I explicate the idea, and the problems, of the intangible
commons.
A. The Creative Commons
The Creative Commons launched in December 2002, offering authors
and artists a set of free copyright licenses with which they could mark
their work and signal the freedoms they intended their work to carry.
Because of the nature of copyright law, and digital networks, the default
for all creative work is "all rights reserved," and any use of a creative
work in digital environment triggers those rights. But the view motivating
those who launched the Creative Commons was that most authors and
creators would do best by reserving some rights, rather than all the rights
copyright secures. Hence the slogan of the organization: "Some Rights
Reserved."
The rights reserved and granted generally get expressed in six core
licenses. These six are the product of four restrictions.39 One restriction
requires "attribution." That requirement applies to every Creative
Commons license. Another restricts "commercial use." A third restricts
derivative uses. And a fourth requires that any derivative be licensed under
a similarly free license.
These licenses are in turn implemented through three distinct layers.
The first layer is a human-readable "Commons Deed" that expresses the
freedoms associated with the content. An example is reproduced below.
38. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). Ostrom's work goes far
towards demonstrating the exaggerations made by those who believed that any commons was a recipe
for disaster. But her analysis is primarily tied to physical resources that are rivalrous. My analysis is
exclusively of nonrivalrous intangible resources.




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss3/4
76 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Supp.:56
D )creativecommons
C 0 M M 0 N S D E E D
Attbuth.-NonCom mrda-of retioO, L5
You.,.l fr..o
V_ to copy, dbtototo, dispy, and per(m the .- k
®Atibutbm You must tttiute the -n a, the manner specal by the outh.o .
®NonomnmedMal You may in use th tomb he ctonmnulM purposcs.
G N. Daiware. Works You my et eter, transform, or bud upon this k.
Yesa fair trse mod oter uights - hi ate way .1fectd by the oboe.
Thib a humn-adable sumwy of the Lmal Code (the ful luenne.
Image No. 2: Creative Commons, Commons Deed40
The second layer is a copyright license, which enforces the freedoms
associated with the content. This license is not a contract, or at least, it
does not rely upon contracting principles for it to be enforceable. It is
rather a set of permissions that authorize what would otherwise be a type
of "trespass." The right to impose the restrictions, and release the
permissions, is triggered of course by the very feature of copyright law
that I criticized above: but for the fact that every "use" of a creative work
in a digital environment was a copy, Creative Commons could not restrict
use without a contract.
Finally, every license also expresses its freedoms in machine readable
form. This permits search engines, and other net technologies, to
understand the freedoms associated with content in a standardized manner.
In the three years since its launch, the project has seen explosive growth
in the adoption of its licenses. Within a year, the project counted over
1,000,000 link-backs to the licenses. At a year and a half, that number was
over 1,800,000. At two, the number was just about 5,000,000. At two and
40. Creative Commons Deed, available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ (last
visited April 12, 2006).
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a half years (last June), the number was just over 12,000,000. At the end
of 2005, Google reported close to 45,000,000 link-backs to Creative
Commons licenses.
The aim of the project should be plain. By creating a standard by which
people can signal the freedoms that they intend their creative work to
carry-different from the default of copyright law-the project aims to
move a significant amount of content into an effectively permission-free
zone. The hope is that supply will in turn create its own demand-that a
practice built upon free culture will support a greater demand more
generally.
B. Challenges: Federation
The project of privately ordering a commons, however, faces a number
of significant challenges. Perhaps the most important is to assure that
freely-licensed creative work can, in a sense, "interoperate." If work
licensed under one free public license cannot be integrated with work
licensed under a second free public license, then a significant part of the
potential for free licensing will be lost.
This problem is plain in the Free Software Movement. There are many
different free software licenses (though the dominant is the Free Software
Foundation's GPL). Many of these licenses, however, are "incompatible."
Incompatibility in this context can be created in two ways. One is that
the preferences of those selecting a free license can be incompatible-for
example, one may want a free license that only requires attribution;
another may want a free license that requires attribution and that
modifications be released; content from the second license cannot be
released under the first. The other is that licenses of the same type can be
crafted to be incompatible-for example, two licenses, each of which
require modified content be released freely, could each require modified
content be released only under that particular license.
The first type of incompatibility can be limited through persuasion. But
so long as people are different, it will not be eliminated. The second
incompatibility, however, is simply a product of bad design. Because of
this bad design, content gets ghettoized into particular licenses, fracturing
the resources for innovation.
The solution to the second incompatibility is standardization. But that
standardization should permit reasonable variation among licenses of the
same type. And such variation can be tolerated so long as there are express
terms within each similar license permitting cross licensing of content
from each.
So for example, a popular type of free content license is a "copyleft"
content license. Such a license gives users the freedom to copy and
distribute the original content, but any modifications of the content must
20061
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be licensed under a similarly free license. One example of this license is
the Free Software Foundation's Free Documentation License (FDL). A
second is the Creative Commons' Attribution-ShareAlike license. A third
is the "Free Art" hosted by a collective in France.
The core freedoms protected by each of these three licenses are the
same. Yet content licensed under one cannot be relicensed under another.
Thus, a photo on Flickr licensed under an Attribution-ShareAlike license
cannot be included in Wikipedia, since Wikipedia is governed by the FDL.
This incompatibility serves no useful purpose. It instead simply
fractures free culture and slows its spread. More importantly, there is no
need for such incompatibility. These licenses can be architected to at least
permit derivatives from one license to be licensed under an "equivalent"
license. And thus to enable this ability to re-license content, Creative
Commons has launched a license interoperability project.
This project will establish a procedure to certify compatibility among
similar license types. That procedure will first verify that the differences
among the licenses are relatively small. If so, then if each license adds a
"compatibility clause"--expressly permitting cross-licensing under
licenses deemed compatible-the license can bear a compatibility
certification mark, so long as it also exposes Creative Commons metadata
appropriate for the license and a Creative Commons "Commons Deed,"
explaining the terms of the license. Once certified, content licensed under
one "Attribution-ShareAlike" license can, when modified, be licensed
under either the original "Attribution-ShareAlike" license, or any
"compatible" "Attribution-ShareAlike" license.
This technique, if successful, will achieve two important ends. First, it
will assure that content is not trapped within any particular license. This is
important particularly to ensure that major content projects not become
isolated from one another. Second, through any migration from one
particular license to another, the system signals the strengths of particular
licenses (those into which content is flowing) and the weaknesses of
others (those from which content is flowing). These signals will help
assure that content gets licensed under systemically strong licenses. It will
thereby also assure the stability of a free license infrastructure.
C. Criticisms of Private Ordering
As with any major movement, Creative Commons has had its critics.
Some of these criticisms flow from obviously conflicting interests. But
others are the product of genuine questions about the wisdom of the
project, or at least the strategy. In this final section, I address one such
critic, Professor Niva Elkin-Koren, whose recent, largely sympathetic,
review of Creative Commons nonetheless raised important questions of
[Supp.:56
23
Lessig: Re-crafting a Public Domain
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
Lessig
strategy. 4' These questions reveal, I suggest, not a difference in ends but
instead a difference in perception about the current challenges that free
culture faces.
Elkin-Koren has a number of concerns about the project. My focus here
is on just one. Put simply, the concern is that the use of licenses to craft
freedom may in turn affect the meaning of that freedom. In particular, it
may change a creative ecology within which one creates and shares
creativity without concern for underlying property rights into one in which
property is central. The focus on licenses may thus make that community
less likely to engage in property-less creativity.
The intuition behind this concern is a picture of the Internet circa 1996,
just before "the copyright wars" had broken out. In that world, there was a
norm of sharing for content that was placed on the web. That norm
reflected not express copyright licenses, but instead an understanding
about the benefit of nonexclusive creativity. This norm had limits of
course-it would be inconsistent with the norm, for example, for an
individual to take another's work and begin to market it commercially. But
within a wide range of acceptable behavior, individuals could take and
build upon the work of others in the Net.
Elkin-Koren's understanding of the early Internet accords with my own.
And indeed, I share the nostalgia for a time when the creativity and
innovation surrounding the Internet occurred oblivious to the underlying
issues of copyright. Some copyright scholars explained this behavior by
invoking the device of an implied license. But I share Elkin-Koren's view
that any such implication was purely constructed. The issue of ownership
over expression was not at issue. Attribution was important. But beyond
attribution, sharing was the norm.
This early understanding of copyright on the Net has now changed.
Fueled by litigation against "piracy," it is no longer possible to describe
content placed on the Net as free for sharing simply because it is placed on
the Net. None could believe (any more at least) that the Net is a copyright-
free zone. Everybody now recognizes that at least with respect to
commercial work, copyright remains the rule.
This new understanding is supported, of course, by the description I
gave at the start about the interaction between the architectures of
copyright law and digital networks. From the perspective of copyright law,
it is in fact correct to say that at least with respect to commercial work,
copyright remains the rule. It is also correct to say that there is no
copyright-based reason to believe the rule of copyright stops at the
commercial-noncommercial line. What makes content subject to
copyright's jurisdiction is that it is used in ways that are within the range
41. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 36.
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of exclusive rights granted to the copyright holder. So long as those rights
include the right to copy, the presumptive reach of copyright covers
absolutely everything done on the Net.
Elkin-Koren does not disagree with this technical description, either of
the law or digital networks. The disagreement is about the best strategy for
resisting the emerging social meaning about creativity on the Net. To the
extent copyright commodifies the creative process, Elkin-Koren worries
Creative Commons will further that commodification. If we talk about
"rights" not only in the context of commercializing content, but also in the
wide range of contexts within which creativity happens without
commercialization, then that will only further fuel a trend to an
understanding about creativity that will be harmful to these earlier norms.
This is an argument about the best strategy in a context where there are
no clear analytical tools for selecting among the strategies. The evolution
of social meaning is an inherently difficult path to track; it is an inherently
difficult dynamic to control. And hence, arguments in this space must
begin by recognizing the humility that the field demands: all we can do is
muster reasons for one view over the other; there is no metric for
reckoning one set of reasons over the other.
And thus, while I certainly concede the concern, my sense of how
meanings evolve in this context is different. Had there not been the
"copyright wars," saying and doing nothing about copyright may well
have been the better strategy. In that context, Creative Commons would be
the solution to no problem, and perhaps would be a problem of its own.
But we do not live in the world of no "copyright wars." The dominant
message of those waging that war has been the core logic of copyright: the
"use" of creative work requires the permission of the copyright owner.
And however optimistic it is to count over 45,000,000 objects on the web
that say "Some Rights Reserved," Google reports over a billion pages on
the web that state "All Rights Reserved." The message of complete control
is loud on the Net, and repeated.
This imbalance has led otherwise balanced institutions to make an
inference about the content they find on the Net. For example, the
presumption within many university "copy shops" is that material found
on the Net cannot be distributed for class without express permission
granted by a copyright owner. This reaction is the product of the
prominence of struggles about copyright in the press, and an aversion to
risk suggested by these struggles. While the average web content does not
express the extreme, the normal does. And institutions faced with this
perception respond as the extreme defines it.
This extremism increasingly confirms another important gap that exists
between ordinary and professional perspectives about copyright. At least
in the United States, there is no ambiguity about whether copyright is
property. And especially in the United States, the understanding that
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copyright is property tends to support a simplistic view about the nature of
that property. The ordinary view about property is binary at its core.
Limits or subtle restrictions on the scope or strength of "copyright" are not
internalized within this view.
The professional view is of course different. Anyone who knows
anything about copyright recognizes the important limitations built into
any copyright system. Lawyers in particular recognize property not as a
thing, but as a bundle of rights. As those rights are very different, it is hard
to see the set as mapping one side of a binary pair.
In this context, my sense is that education helps. Demonstrating the
wide range of "permissions" built into a copyright regime is a part of that
education. If the frame of analysis is binary--either you "respect
copyright" or you do not-then the normalcy of the "All Rights Reserved"
is conceded. But if the frame of analysis is more diverse-recognizing the
many steps between "No rights respected" and "All Rights Reserved"-
then the extremism of "All Rights Reserved" can be recognized. The
diversity of positions between zero and one encourages a dialog about
which level is appropriate. And given the diversity of creative forms, my
expectation at least is that the equilibrium view is far from the extreme.
The data from Creative Commons confirm some of this, as the pattern
of licensing has been consistent and diverse. Two thirds of Creative
Commons licensors restrict commercial use of their creative work. Two
thirds permit derivatives. And of those who permit derivatives, half
require that any derivative be released under a similarly free license. All of
these licensors, through this process of marking content with the freedom
they intend it to have, now see something of the diversity that copyright
supports. And many of those who have come across these licenses now
understand something of that diversity that they likely did not see before.
Against the background of the "copyright wars," this feels like progress.
A second feature of Elkin-Koren's concern, however, I feel more
strongly about. This concern we could call the fear of contracting.
Ignoring for the moment the view that licenses such as the GPL or the
Creative Commons licenses are not contracts, or at least, not necessarily
understood as contracts, this fear of contracting is the concern that private
ordering structures may weaken fundamental freedoms. This concern is
distinct from concern about social meaning. It is born in struggles against
"click-wrap" or "shrink-wrap" licensing. In those contexts, contracts are
often used to get the consumer to waive important consumer rights. These
rights, established by the law as defaults, are effectively modified by
devices that condition access to important resources on waiving these
default rights.
The concern over the effect of shrink-wrap licenses is important. And
work done by many, especially Pam Samuelson, to resist legislation
supporting such licensing was critical to avoiding the radical restructuring
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of underlying contracting freedoms. 42 But in my view, the tool (shrink-
wrap licensing) was properly criticized because of the baseline benefits it
modified. The problem was not that individuals were participating in
crafting a new baseline; the problem was the obvious problems in the new
baseline that their individual actions would create.
But if the problem is the baseline itself, then in my view, an efficient
tool for modifying that baseline is a solution, and not properly a target of
criticism. Opting out of an oppressive regime is a good thing, even if the
device facilitating that opt-out is properly criticized when it used to opt out
of a free(er) regime.
This is an obvious point. But it is missed, I suggest, when one fails to
recognize the inversion that the Internet has effected with respect to
creative freedom. Were there no such inversion, then there would be no
urgent need to escape the new baseline. But in light of that inversion, it is
my view that the tools to facilitate escape are not subject to criticism
simply because similar tools are used to undesirable ends.
The qualification "similar" is critical here. For again, a copyright license
is not, at its core, a contract. It operates within what the Germans call "the
corridor of freedom" that copyright law creates. But it is a license crafted
against the background of property law. Property law has thus set the
default; the license is a way to escape that default. And where, again, the
default is so extreme, devices that facilitate an escape are not, in my view,
subject to condemnation.
Finally, we should consider more explicitly the role of DRM in this
debate about strategy and meaning. Were we assured that the next 10
years would simply continue as a struggle of ideas between competing
visions of how creativity should be shared, then, in my view, Elkin-
Koren's concerns would be quite strong. We might expect a more
balanced position to emerge from the simple tide of competing ideas. But
if, as I believe, we are facing a fundamental shift in the architecture
through which digital culture is accessed, then it becomes more urgent to
at least mark, and rally, an alternative view. From this perspective, the
function of Creative Commons licenses is not so much to produce a
particular mix of freedom. It is instead to mark clearly an alternative view
of the mix between freedom and control. When the technology makes it
seem to most as if there is no choice about whether copyright gets
respected perfectly, the role of these alternative movements is to sow
dissent.
42. This was the battle to stop "UCITA," which would have "updated" contract law for
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CONCLUSION
As a descriptive matter, there has been a radical change in the scope and
vitality of the public domain. About that I assert there can be no
disagreement. As a normative matter, one can be troubled about this
change, or not. Some support it; some celebrate it; but that support and
celebration reflect important values.
For those who are troubled by this change, this essay has mapped two
(sometimes) complementary strategies in response. These strategies are
designed to restore a commons-either legally, by restoring a public
domain, or effectively, through voluntary acts that produce a simulated
public domain.
Both strategies are motivated by an urgency surrounding this debate. As
the infrastructure of digital networks is being changed to implement
through code the extreme control now recognized in law, it is especially.
important that a different perspective on the mix between control and
freedom be visible. Whether this alternative can prevail is a hard question.
But even if one believes it will not, marking clearly what we lose is
nonetheless an important effort.
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